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This chapter examines the role of departmental secretaries in France. It will be 
suggested that, in contrast to some of the more long-standing and well-
known accounts of the French public service, departmental secretaries do not 
comprise an homogeneous set of actors. There are commonalities between 
them, but their origins, behaviour and future career trajectories remain quite 
varied. The result is a certain shared experience but one which is lived by 
different individuals in different ways. 
 
Politics and administration in France: traditions and change 
 
In France, as elsewhere, the role of departmental secretaries is conditioned by 
the basic political and administrative traditions within which the system 
works. The key political characteristic concerns the presence of a twin-headed 
executive with both a strong head of state and an active head of government. 
The key administrative characteristic relates to a powerful and highly 
centralised set of state institutions. It should be noted, though, that in recent 
times both elements of the French administrative tradition have been 
challenged. 
 The Fifth French Republic was established in late 1958 replacing the 
Fourth Republic (1946-58) which was beset by extreme governmental 
instability.1 Initially, the Fifth Republic was structured as a parliamentary 
system with an indirectly elected president who served for seven years and a 
prime minister who was responsible to the lower house of the legislature, the 
National Assembly. However, in 1962 the constitution was reformed to 
provide for the direct election of the president. Since this time, therefore, the 
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Fifth Republic has operated with a semi-presidential form of government 
(Duverger 1970; Elgie 1999). Even prior to this reform, though, power within 
the government was skewed towards the president. Indeed, there is a vast 
literature on the apparent presidentialisation of the regime (see, for example, 
Gicquel, 1995). 
 That said, the president’s power is limited in two respects. Firstly, 
presidential pre-eminence is contingent upon a favourable parliamentary 
majority and for much of the Fifth Republic such a majority has been 
forthcoming. On three occasions, though, the majority has opposed the 
president and power has shifted to the prime minister (1986-88, 1993-95 and 
1997 to date). Secondly, whatever the majority, the prime minister is still a 
key figure within the system. Article 21 of the 1958 constitution states that the 
prime minister is in general charge of the government’s work and is 
responsible for the implementation of laws.2 Thus, the prime minister is 
always at the heart of the governmental machine and is charged with 
overseeing the day-to-day functioning of the policy-making process including 
the coordination of the administration. 
 The net result of this situation is that in France departmental 
secretaries operate within the confines of a twin-headed political executive in 
which both the president and prime minister are significant political actors. 
So, departmental secretaries have to contend directly with the minister, the 
prime minister and the president and it is the often complicated relationship 
between these three actors that provides the political context within which 
the most senior members of the administration operate. So, for example, on 
some occasions, the minister and prime minister may be allied against the 
president. On other occasions, though, the minister may try to short-circuit 
the prime minister and seek the favour of the head of state personally. 
Whatever the situation, departmental secretaries cannot help but be drawn 
into these political battles. Indeed, as will be seen, their own position may at 
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times depend on the success or otherwise of the alliances made at the political 
level. 
 In addition to the political context, departmental secretaries in France 
also operate within a long and well-established administrative tradition. 
Central to this tradition is the basic distinction between the public sphere and 
the private. The former is said to be the incarnation of the general will, the 
common good, or the national interest. By contrast, the latter is viewed as 
essentially self-interested behaviour and, therefore, potentially divisive. 
Needless to say, in practice this distinction is by no means clear cut and the 
above representations are little more than caricatural. At the same time, 
however, it also provides the underlying rationale for one of the main 
features of the French system, namely a strong state. There has been a long-
standing belief in the benefits of state intervention among members of the 
political elite. The result is that over the years the French state developed as a 
highly centralised and strongly directive (or dirigiste) force.3 Moreover, it has 
also led to a system of administrative training schools (the grandes écoles) 
designed to create a class of elite public sector officials whose prime function 
is to serve the state rationally and disinterestedly. 
 As might be expected, this aspect of the French administrative 
tradition has had a considerable effect on the role of departmental secretaries. 
As will be seen, a substantial proportion of them have studied at one or other 
of the  grandes écoles. Their training is, thus, profoundly state-centric. They are 
imbued with the ethos of the state, even if their interpretation of it is 
necessarily individual (see the personal accounts below). Moreover, in many 
cases departmental secretaries head organisations with a considerable policy 
reach and their decisions frequently have wide-ranging implications for the 
well-being of ordinary citizens. The result is that they have an administrative 
and social responsibility which they do not take lightly. Indeed, this point still 
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applies, even though the scope of state intervention has been reduced in 
certain domains (see below). 
 There is no doubt, therefore, that departmental secretaries are central 
to the functioning of the French state. There is also no doubt, though, that 
over the years the legitimacy of the state has been increasingly contested. The 
classic critique in this regard comes from Crozier (1963; 1970). Here, the main 
line of argument is that the strength of the state is also its main source of 
weakness. The state, it is said, is impersonal and becomes increasingly 
removed from the citizenry. This feature, combined with the cultural 
observation that the French eschew face-to-face negotation and compromise, 
renders the state extremely fragile as it is unable to respond to a changing 
society. In this context, the disjunction between state and society is said to 
grow ever greater until there is an outburst of popular discontentment that 
leads to a degree of reform. According to this line of thought, the key task is 
to ‘unblock’ the state and make it more responsive to social demands 
(Crozier, 1979). 
 The political response to this critique has varied. In general terms, the 
left has tended to emphasise the need for the decentralisation of state power 
and the deconcentration of public sector resources with the aim of bringing 
decision-making closer to the citizenry. Indeed, the most enduring legacy of 
the Mitterrand presidency (1981-95) was undoubtedly the reorganisation of 
local-level institutions. These reforms created a new regional tier of elected 
local authorities. They also extended the powers of local decision-makers, 
notably mayors. The net result has been the rise of a multi-level form of 
governance in which state and social actors are joint partners (Le Galès, 1995). 
By contrast, the right has tended to promote privatisation as a solution to the 
supposedly unmanageable and overweening state. There have been two main 
waves of privatisation (1986-87 and 1993-97) during which time all or part of 
a considerable number of high-profile public sector concerns have been sold 
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off. These included banks, insurance companies, the main television station 
(TF1) and several utilities, such as France Telecom.4 
 These reforms have had some effect on the role of departmental 
secretaries. Most notably, they have increased the number of actors with 
which most departmental secretaries have to deal. For example, there are 
now close links between local actors and departmental secretaries, notably 
concerning the preparation of the centre-local planning contracts. In addition, 
it might be argued that these reforms, and others, have served to reduce 
somewhat the lustre of the higher civil service. The state is no longer in as 
powerful a position as it was before. Thus, service to the state is no longer 
seen to be as prestigious as it was before. So, while it would be wrong to 
suggest that departmental secretaries occupy anything other than a highly 
coveted position within the state, there is also a sense in which the role of the 
state itself and, by extension, state officials is now being increasingly 
questioned both outside and indeed within the public service. 
 The impact of the decentralisation and privatisation reforms has not 
been matched by an equivalent set of managerial-style changes to 
government departments. There have been two main reforms in this respect. 
The first was introduced in 1989 by the socialist prime minister, Michel 
Rocard. The so-called renouveau du service public, or renewal of the public 
sector, was designed to modernise the administrative system by creating a 
greater degree of flexibility in the ‘grid’ system of pay differentials, by 
devolving certain executive management functions from central ministries to 
departmental field services, by introducing programme evaluation and by 
simplifying certain administrative procedures. The second was the Réforme de 
l’État et des services publics proposed in 1995 by the gaullist prime minister, 
Alain Juppé. This reform had a similar set of aims, focusing once again on 
issues such as deconcentration and performance evaluation, but this time 
included more specific proposals concerning contractualisation. The fact 
 6 
remains, though, that neither reform fundamentally transformed the 
functioning of government departments. As one set of writers put it, despite 
such reform proposals “much of the machinery of a centralized civil service 
remains fundamentally unaltered” (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000: 231).5 
 Plans to reform the administration have come up against two main 
obstacles. The first is the higher civil service itself. There is an entrenched 
belief amongst this class of people that they are already engaging in a process 
of rational decision-making. This is the essence of their training at the grandes 
écoles. However, on the basis of this assumption it follows that there are no 
efficiencies to be gained from managerial reform. Thus, the higher civil 
service has not promoted mangerialism as an end in itself. The second 
obstacle is the public sector unions. The level of unionisation in France is 
relatively low. However, public sector unions remain strong and active. They 
mobilised extremely effectively to stop the Juppé reforms of the social 
security system and pension funds in 1995. They are also a core component of 
the left’s electoral constituency. They are, thus, in a strategically important 
position to stop or at least considerably dilute the reform process. 
 The result of this situation is that the role of a departmental secretary 
now is still extremely similar to the equivalent role thirty years ago. True, 
there is a slightly greater degree of managerial flexibility in the current period 
than before. For example, some departmental secretaries have the power to 
reward individual performance.6 There is also a slightly greater degree of 
interministerial coordination and evaluation than was previously the case. 
For the most part, though, the job remains largely unchanged. The 
opportunities for individual innovation are relatively small. Instead, the key 
to reform is political will. Currently, though, the will to transform the system 
is mainly notable by its absence. 
 Against this background, the role of French departmental secretaries 
will now be explored. The aims are to identify this class of people in the 
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French system, to show that a proportion of them have certain common 
educational, social and professional links, to demonstrate that they constitute 
a somewhat politicised elite, to outline the tensions inherent in their 
functions, and to provide two personal accounts of how French departmental 
secretaries view themselves. 
 
Who are the French departmental secretaries? 
 
The internal organisation of French departments is markedly different from 
their British counterparts. Indeed, so different are the two systems that the 
first problem to be encountered when studying French departmental 
secretaries is to identify exactly who these people are. There simply is no 
exact equivalent of the British permanent secretary in the French case. That 
said, in the French system of government there are people who resemble 
British-style permanent secretaries quite closely. They are the directeurs 
d’administration centrale and the directeurs of ministerial cabinets.7 True, these 
people occupy two distinct positions in the French administrative system and 
neither of these positions corresponds exactly to the system in the British 
case. However, the fact that there are two such positions in France is a direct 
consequence of the basic internal differences between British and French 
ministries. These differences concern the organisation of departmental line 
hierarchies in the two countries and the institutionalised presence in France 
of ministerial cabinets. In this way, the identification of French-style 
departmental secretaries flows from the peculiarities of the French system. It 
is not the result of trying to impose an unnatural form of categorisation on a 
very different type of system. 
 The first difference between British and French departments relates to 
the organisation of departmental line hierarchies. In 1882 the organisation of 
French departments was profoundly reformed. Prior to this time, each 
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Ministry had an overarching secrétariat général, headed by a secrétaire général. 
As such, there were clear similarities between the position of French 
secrétaires généraux and British permanent secretaries. After the reform, 
though, most French departments were split into directions, or directions 
générales, each of which was headed by either a directeur or a directeur général 
respectively.8 Since this time the number of directions has always varied from 
department to department. In some junior ministries there may only be two 
or three directions. However, in a large department there may be more than a 
dozen all told. By and large directions are organised vertically, or sectorally. In 
other words, each has responsibility for a particular policy remit. Some 
directions, though, are organised horizontally and coordinate a certain aspect 
of the department’s work. For example, a number of departments have a 
general financial and administrative affairs direction (DAFAG) which is 
responsible for personnel issues and for drawing together the departmental 
budget submission. That said, it might be noted that the Foreign Affairs 
Ministry has always maintained its original structure and is still headed by a 
secrétaire général.9 Moreover, it might also be noted that the French equivalent 
of the British Cabinet Office, the Secrétariat général du gouvernement, is also 
headed by a single figure. There is, thus, a clear equivalent of the British 
Cabinet Secretary in the French system. For the most part, though, directions 
are the basic stand-alone organisational units within a Ministry. As a result, 
French departments are highly fragmented. There is no single administrative 
figure at the head of the department. In this sense, there is no distinct 
departmental secretary. However, the directeurs d’administration centrale are 
one the nearest French equivalents to British permanent secretaries in that 
they are at the head of the different directions within the department. As such, 
it is reasonable to focus on them for the purposes of this study. 
 The second difference between Britain and France concerns the French 
system of ministerial cabinets. Since the time of the Third Republic it has 
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become the established practice for every minister, as well as the president 
and the prime minister, to appoint a set of personal advisers who are 
collectively known as the cabinet. The general function of a cabinet is to serve 
and assist the minister’s political and policy-making role. In the past, 
ministers were officially allowed to appoint up to ten people to their cabinet, 
whereas the figure for junior ministers (Ministres délégués and Secrétariats 
d’État) was seven. However, in 1995, ministers were restricted to five 
appointments and junior ministers to only three. These rules, though, have 
since been relaxed. In any case, there have never been any limitations on the 
number of people that both the prime minister and the president may appoint 
and ministers have always made unofficial appointments so inflating the 
actual number of people who are part of the cabinet system. In terms of the 
present study one key aspect of the French system is that cabinets are 
organised hierarchically. Each cabinet is headed by a directeur de cabinet. The 
directeur de cabinet works closely with the minister and is undoubtedly the 
minister’s most loyal and most immediate interlocutor. Again, therefore, 
while there are no doubt many dissimilarities between French directeurs de 
cabinet and British permanent secretaries, the former can be considered to be a 
reasonable equivalent of the latter.10 
 One consequence of the differences between the organisation of British 
and French departments is that the number of departmental secretaries in the 
French case is much higher than the equivalent figure in the British case. 
Indeed, the figure in France is much higher than the equivalent figure in all of 
the other countries examined in this study. So, for example, in 1983 one writer 
identified 154 directions and direction générales in the French system (Salon 
1983: 141).11 Similarly, another writer calculated that at any one time there 
was an average of 160 directions from 1984-94 (Rouban 1996: 22). Yet another 
writer has suggested an average figure of 170 (Quermonne 1991: 64). In fact, 
there was a grand total of 555 different directeurs d’administration centrale from 
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1984-94 (Rouban 1996: 19). In addition, at any one time there are also usually 
between 30-40 directeurs de cabinet in the system. Indeed, in 1988 there were 48 
ministers and from 1984-96 there were 412 directeurs de cabinet in all (Rouban 
1997a: 18).12 As a result, therefore, at any given point there are likely to be 
around 200 people in the French system who are the equivalent of British 
permanent secretaries. Moreover, given that the present study is dealing with 
a 30 year period and that, as will be shown, the average tenure of a French 
departmental secretary is about three years, this means that there were 
approximately 2,000 different departmental secretaries in France from 1970-
99. 
 In this general context, two preliminary remarks should be made. 
Firstly, it is simply beyond the scope of this chapter to provide a profile of 
every departmental secretary from 1970-99. The net result is that the analysis 
in the following sections is necessarily partial and can provide only an 
indication of general trends throughout the whole period under 
consideration.13 Secondly, by virtue of the fact that there are so many of them, 
French departmental secretaries comprise a varied set of people at any one 
point in time. Thus, to say that only general trends can be identified is 
somewhat more than just a methodological caveat. It is also a fundamental 
observation about the nature of the French higher public service. In contrast 
to certain studies,14 the argument in this chapter is that in France there is a 
great variety to departmental secretaries. They come from a large range of 
backgrounds; they head many different types of organisations; and 
subsequently their career paths diverge. Thus, while in some respects it is 
possible to establish a portrait robot of the average French departmental 
secretary, the indistinct nature of any such picture should be noted. 
 
Education, social and professional background: some statistics 
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This section draws exclusively on material from two sources. The first is a 
study by Siwek-Pouydesseau (1969). This work considers the background of 
directeurs d’administration centrale just prior to the general period under 
consideration in this book. However, it is a relatively comprehensive study 
and does provide a useful comparison with other more up-to-date work. The 
second is a paper by Luc Rouban (1996), which is a detailed study of all the 
directeurs d’administration centrale who held office from 1984-94. True, it 
examines only one element of the set of French departmental secretaries as 
defined in this chapter and it covers only one part of the period under 
consideration in the book as a whole. Nevertheless, the comprehensive nature 
of the study means that it constitutes the major reference work of its type and 
is, thus, an invaluable resource. These two studies provide the best material 
currently available on this topic and so they will provide the raw data for the 
analysis in this section.15 
 According to Rouban, from 1984-94 an overwhelming percentage of 
directeurs d’administration centrale were male. Indeed, only 3.8 per cent were 
female.16 In addition, the average age of directeurs at the time of their 
appointment was 47 and they served in office for an average of 3.6 years. In 
these respects, the similarities with the Siwek-Pouydesseau study are striking. 
She concluded that in the period from 1958-66 directeurs served for an average 
of around three and a half years, that the average age of an incumbent 
directeur was around 51 and that there were very few female directeurs, to the 
point that in 1967 there was not a single serving female directeur. Thus, there 
appears to have been little change over time. 
 In terms of their educational background, Rouban’s study showed that 
only 0.9 per cent of directeurs d’administration centrale had no higher education 
qualification whatsoever, whereas 61.7 per cent had two such qualifications 
and 13.7 per cent had three. The most common qualification was the diploma 
from the prestigious Institut d’Études Politiques (or Sciences-Po) in Paris (34.6 
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per cent), followed by those who had studied law (24.0 per cent), languages 
(14.1 per cent) and then those who had followed a more scientific or technical 
path (13.9 per cent). Consistent with the traditional image of the French 
higher civil servant, 42.3 per cent of directeurs had then studied at the École 
Nationale d’Administration (ENA), one of the so-called grandes écoles and 
which provides specialised administrative training for fast-track civil 
servants. In addition, a further 13.9 per cent had been to the other main grande 
école, the École Polytechnique (X), which provides training for more 
scientifically oriented officials. Finally, 6.7 per cent of directeurs had been to 
one of the other training schools in the French system, while a total of 23.8 per 
cent had not been to any grande école whatsoever. 
 Again, the similarities between Rouban’s study and Siwek-
Pouydesseau’s work are noteworthy. For example, the earlier work shows 
that an equally large proportion of directeurs d’administration centrale were 
very well educated with around a half of them having more than one higher 
education qualification and with these people tending to show a similar bias 
for law and politics/administration. The main difference between the two 
studies concerns the percentage of directeurs who had studied at ENA. In the 
previous period the figures were 7.2 per cent in 1960 and 14.5 per cent in 
1967, both much lower than in the later period. The explanation is relatively 
straightforward. ENA was only established in 1945. Thus, in the earlier 
period, among the typical age cohort of those who were likely to be 
appointed as directeurs fewer people had had the opportunity to study at 
ENA. Now, though, everybody has, in theory, had such an opportunity and, 
as a result, ENA has become a much more common point of passage for 
directeurs as a whole. Finally, it should be noted that in 1967 13.5 per cent of 
directeurs had been to the École Polytechnique. This figure is almost exactly 
the same as the average in Rouban’s study. 
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 Figures on their social background for the earlier period are not 
available. However, in the period 1984-94 the statistics show that 50.5 per cent 
of directeurs d’administration centrale were drawn from the upper classes, 19.3 
per cent from the middle classes and 7.6 per cent from the lower classes. 
However, these figures need to be complemented by the fact that figures for 
22.7 per cent of the total cohort from 1994-94 were unavailable. The 
significance of this figure is that it means the percentage of those coming from 
the middle and lower classes is probably under-represented because these 
people are less likely to be mentioned in sources such as Who’s Who from 
where many of the data were obtained. Finally, it might also be noted that 
32.7 per cent of directeurs were children of civil servants, of which 5.6 per cent 
had a parent who was of a member of the grands corps, such as the Conseil 
d’État and the Inspection des Finances. The grands corps comprise the highest 
grades in the French administrative system. 
 
Procedures for appointment and dismissal and some more statistics 
 
In contrast to certain other countries the procedures for appointing and 
dismissing French departmental secretaries are politicised. This point is 
particularly true for directeurs de cabinet but it is only slightly less true for 
directeurs d’administration centrale. 
 
i) Directeurs de cabinet 
 
Directeurs de cabinet have close links with the administration. Many of them 
have a background in the administration and many of their activities are 
geared towards the administrative aspects of the department’s work (see 
below). Moreover, it might also be noted that for the most part cabinet 
members are not paid out of the ministerial budget. If they are appointed 
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from within the administration, they continue to be paid according to their 
existing career grade and only receive a relatively small supplementary 
income on top. Thus, financially, too, many of them are closely linked with 
the administration. At the same time, though, cabinet members are highly 
politicised. The cabinet is not part of the permanent administration and the 
main task of cabinet members is to give the minister political as well as 
technical advice about policy matters. 
 Directeurs de cabinet are appointed by the minister and they can be 
dismissed by the minister at any time for any reason. Moreover, the minister 
has a completely free rein when making the appointment and can call upon 
people from inside or outside the administration. That said, it is not 
completely unheard of for the president and/or prime minister to insist that 
the minister appoint a particular person.17 For example, in November 1999 
when the Finance Minister, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, resigned in 
controversial circumstances, his directeur de cabinet stayed on to serve the new 
minister, Christian Sautter, thus signalling that there would be policy 
continuity. There seems little doubt that the prime minister actively 
supported this decision.18 For the most part, though, ministers choose whom 
they want. 
 Because ministers usually have a free choice they tend to appoint 
people with whom they have previously worked, people whom they know 
they can trust, people whose loyalty is already guaranteed. In this sense, 
directeurs de cabinet are usually people who have demonstrated a certain 
technical expertise but who are also politically motivated. The fact that they 
are technically competent is reflected in their professional background. Most 
directeurs de cabinet  have pursued a career in the higher civil service. 
Moreover, an overwhelming majority of these people have been to ENA or 
another grande école, while an almost equally overwhelming majority belong 
either to one of the grands corps or to the only slightly less prestigious corps of 
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administrateurs civils (see Table 1). At the same time, though, the fact that 
directeurs de cabinet are politically motivated is demonstrated by their 
relatively high level of political engagement. For example, in the Fabius 
government from 1984-86, 38.6 per cent of directeurs and directeurs adjoints had 
either stood for election, worked for a party, belonged to a political club, 
engaged in trades union activity or engaged in a similar type of political 
activity (Rouban 1997a: 25). 
 
Table 1 here. 
 
 This mixture of technical competence and political experience is also 
reflected in where they go when they leave their post. A large percentage 
simply return the state sector, either to the administration or a public sector 
institution (see Table 2). However, the largest proportion go on to occupy 
another cabinet post. In this way, although the average tenure of directeurs de 
cabinet is around three years, many end up spending a considerable part of 
their career as senior ministerial advisors. 
 
Table 2 here. 
 
ii) Directeurs d’administration centrale  
 
In some respects, the position of the directeurs d’administration centrale is 
slightly different from directeurs de cabinet. In theory directeurs d’administration 
centrale represent the apex of the administrative element of French 
departmental structure and the procedures governing their appointment and 
dismissal are codified in a set of formal rules. However, such is the nature of 
these rules that once again ministers are effectively free to choose 
whomsoever they want. In practice this means again that, while professional 
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competence is a basic prerequisite of the job, on occasions political 
considerations are not far from the surface when an appointment is being 
made. 
 Article 13 of the 1958 constitution states that the president has the right 
to make a certain number of civil and military appointments. It then goes on 
to state that directeurs d’administration centrale constitute one class of 
appointments that are made by way of a decree in the Council of Ministers. In 
addition, it says the president signs all the decrees agreed in the Council of 
Ministers. The president, therefore, would appear to be closely associated 
with the appointment of directeurs. However, this article should not be 
misunderstood. It does not mean that the president actually chooses who will 
be appointed. On the contrary, appointments are invariably proposed by the 
minister, usually following deliberations between the minister and the 
minister’s directeur de cabinet, invariably after discussions with the prime 
minister’s advisers and the president’s advisers, and usually after 
consultation with people in the administration itself, notably those with 
responsibility for personnel matters.19 However, the president’s involvement 
is nevertheless potentially significant during periods of ‘cohabitation’, when 
the president and prime minister belong to opposing political parties. This is 
because, while in general terms power shifts to the prime minister during this 
time, there is also an unwritten rule that the president should be allowed to 
maintain a degree of influence over Article 13 appointments. For directeurs 
d’administration, centrale there is no substantive evidence to prove that 
presidents have systematically tried to foist political opponents on reluctant 
ministers during these periods. Instead, for the most part presidents have 
confined themselves to military and diplomatic matters, leaving 
appointments in the domain of domestic policy to the prime minister.20 
However, on occasions presidents have intervened in this domain too. For 
example, in 1998 President Chirac was able to use his powers to delay the 
 17 
dismissal of one directeur in the Finance Ministry and to obtain the removal of 
another (Yolka 1999: 748). 
 Whatever the influence of the president, it is clear that nominally at 
least Article 13 places the appointment of directeurs d’administration centrale in 
the political domain. Moreover, Article 1 of a subsequent decree21 states that 
directeurs are part of the set of appointments which “are left to the discretion 
of government in regard to both the nomination and cessation of their 
functions”. In other words, like the appointment of directeurs de cabinet, the 
government has a completely free rein when it comes to appointing and 
dismissing directeurs d’administration centrale.22 Again, this means that the 
government can appoint people from outside the public service if it so 
chooses. It also means that the government can dismiss a directeur at any time 
without having to provide a formal reason. The directeur has no way of 
challenging such a decision, except in the very unlikely instance where 
misconduct has been alleged. In this case, the directeur can invoke due process 
and contest the case. For the most part, though, in stark contrast to almost all 
other positions in the French administration where job security is still 
virtually guaranteed, directeurs d’administration centrale have no security of 
tenure whatsoever. 
 The formal statutes also distinguish between a ‘function’ and a career 
‘grade’, or corps in the French public service.23 The post of directeur 
d’administration centrale is deemed to be a functional employment. There is no 
separate corps of directeur. Thus, when an appointment is made from within 
the administration, as a large percentage are (see below), the person 
concerned is merely deemed to be on ‘secondment’ (détachement) from his or 
her normal career ‘grade’. The corollary of this point is that when the 
directeur’s employment is terminated, he or she has the automatic right to 
return to the original corps. In this way, the threat of being sacked is 
somewhat tempered by the fact that in the event the directeur has a 
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guaranteed job to go back to. This is not to say, of course, that the person in 
question will actually want to go back to that job. It may be a retrograde 
career step. There may also be a financial disincentive to do so as directeurs 
are often entitled to a prime, or supplementary payment, which is not 
transferable. The result is that there may be pressure for the government to 
find suitable replacement positions for outgoing directeurs even when there is 
a clash of political loyalties. For example, during the first period of 
‘cohabitation’ in 1986 a deal was struck between the president and newly 
elected prime minister such that the outgoing Secrétaire général du 
gouvernement was subsequently appointed as the head of a state-owned 
public utility company, Gaz de France, to compensate for his dismissal 
(Favier and Martin-Roland 1991: 504). It should be noted, though, that on 
occasions such posts are difficult to come across and departures sometimes 
end up being delayed until a suitable position is found. 
 These appointing procedures have two results (see Table 3). First, most 
appointments are made internally from within the administration on the basis 
of a demonstrated professional ability. For example, in 1984-85 only 8.3 per 
cent of all new appointments were made from outside the administrative 
sphere (Rouban 1996: 23). Moreover, internal appointments are regularly 
made from among members of the grands corps or the administrateurs civils  
(Rouban 1996: 29). Indeed, Rouban shows that from 1984-94 53.6 per cent of 
all directeurs belonged to one or other of these categories of civil servants 
(ibid.). Thus, like directeurs de cabinet, there is a distinct set of directeurs 
d’administration centrale who share a common professional background. 
Indeed, this is true generally, but it is particularly true with regard to specific 
ministries. Directeurs from certain corps often monopolise certain ministerial 
positions. For example, invariably the head of the direction des routes in the 
Transport Ministry will be someone who belongs to the technical corps des 
ponts et chaussées. Similarly, the Secrétaire général du gouvernement has tended 
 19 
to be from the Conseil d’État. The fact that certain positions are to all intents 
and purposes reserved for people from particular administrative 
backgrounds means that there is often disquiet when this (albeit unwritten) 
rule is broken. Thus, when a conseiller d’État was appointed as the first non-
historian or chartist [a former student of the École des Chartes in Paris] head 
of the direction des Archives for nearly 150 years, this naturally caused a stir 
within administrative circles. (See below). There was a fear that this decision 
would set a prcedent and that the Conseil d’État would be able to claim this 
position as its own in future years. 
 
Table 3 here. 
 
 Second, whether the appointee comes from inside or outside the 
administration and whatever their professional background, there is also no 
doubt that political outlook is often one of the additional factors taken into 
account when an appointment is made. This is not to say that directeurs are 
overtly party political. On the contrary, in contrast to the figures for directeurs 
de cabinet (above) Rouban (1996) shows that between 1984-94 only 6.8 per cent 
of directeurs d’administration centrale had worked for the Socialist party 
compared with an even lower figure for the two main right-wing parties (1.4 
per cent for the RPR and 0.5 per cent for the UDF). It is simply to say that, 
along with professional qualifications and task-competence, political 
sympathy has long been a key element that ministers have taken into 
consideration (Rouban 1996: p. 26). Indeed, Rouban goes so far as to argue 
that over time the level of politicisation has increased (ibid, p. 26). 
 In these ways, the French system exhibits some of the characteristics of 
a traditional spoils system. So, when there is an alternation in power there 
will usually be changes at the level of directeur d’administration centrale. For 
example, there is some evidence to suggest that in 1981 the newly-appointed 
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Communist ministers for Health, Transport and the Public Service were 
“particularly active” (Stevens 1985: 157) in replacing their directeurs 
d’administration centrale and that the same was also true for some Socialist 
ministries as well, such as Culture, Research, Justice, Education and Solidarity 
(Lochak 1985: 171). Indeed, in the last three months of 1981 and the first three 
months of 1982 a total of 46 per cent of all directeurs were changed and by 
May 1983, two years after the left had won power, 70 per cent of all directeurs 
had been replaced (Passeron 1987: 27). 
 However large these figures might be, and they are testimony to both 
the general politicisation of the service and the unusual nature of the 1981 
alternation, it is also the case that in most instances the rhythm of change is 
relatively gradual. So, for example, in 1986 only 21 directeurs were replaced in 
the first three months of the new government (Rouban 1996: 21). The 
equivalent figures for 1988, 1993 and 1995 were 11, 14 and 17 respectively. 
However, in the period 1986-87 a total of 132 directeurs were replaced, in 
1988-89 73 were changed, in 1993-94 89 were moved (Rouban 1996: 21.) and in 
1995-96 70 were changed (Yolka 1999: 745). 
 Thus, when a new government comes to power there is a ‘witch-hunt’ 
of sorts, but it does not occur overnight. Moreover, many directeurs survive 
the arrival of a new government in power and stay on to serve their new 
political masters for a considerable period of time. For example, while 
Communist ministers may have been keen to change their directeurs in 1981, 
when they returned to government in 1997 they took great care not to 
politicise the appointments in their domain. Thus, in 1999 the Communist 
Transport Minister appointed a former gaullist cabinet member as the head of 
the direction des routes. Indeed, similar examples can be found throughout this 
Ministry in the period after 1997. All told, therefore, there is certainly a 
degree of politicisation in the appointment of directeurs d’administration 
centrale, but they do not constitute a party political class. 
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 In terms of subsequent career trajectories, when directeurs leave their 
post they end up in a variety of different places (see Table 4). As noted above, 
many will simply go back to the corps from which they were originally 
appointed. They will return, for example, to the Conseil d’État and resume 
their role as the arbiters on matters of constitutional and administrative law. 
Some will be transferred to another administrative post either in the same 
department or in another part of the administration. A small number will 
retire. An equally small number will move directly into politics. For example, 
in 1991 the head of the president’s advisory staff, Jean-Louis Bianco, was 
appointed as Minister for Social Affairs and in 1995 the head of the direction 
des routes in the Ministry for Public Amenities, Housing, Transport and 
Tourism was appointed as the junior minister for Transport in the newly 
elected Juppé government. Finally, a relatively large percentage will leave the 
central administration altogether. Many of these people were initially 
appointed from the private sector or the wider public sector in the first place. 
In this sense, they will simply return to their former home. However, civil 
servants are increasingly finding that they can pursue a lucrative career 
outside the administration and more and more are choosing to do so. 
 
Table 4 here. 
 
 In conclusion, therefore, for some people appointment to the position 
of directeur d’administration centrale is part of a normal career progression. It is 
not unusual for sous-directeurs (the next organisational unit down in the 
ministerial hierarchy) and directeurs-adjoint (assistant directors) to be 
promoted in this way. However, few people actually end their career as a 
directeur and retire. Moreover, some people serve as a directeur on more than 
one occasion. Especially in the more technically oriented ministries, it is not 
unusual for people to be reappointed to the position after a period away from 
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the post.24 For most, though, the post of directeur is a springboard to another 
more prestigious post in the administration, such as a senior post in the 
Conseil d’État, either immediately or at a somewhat later date perhaps when 
a more politically favourable government is back in office. Alternatively, it is 
part of a highly diversified career profile for those whose professional points 
of reference lie not just in the central administration itself but also in the 
private sector or the public sector more widely. 
 
French departmental secretaries and their role25 
 
The analysis suggests, therefore, that French departmental secretaries are 
drawn from a variety of professional backgrounds and that when they leave 
office they transfer to a variety of occupations. There are undoubtedly some 
commonalities between certain sets of directeurs, especially in terms of their 
social origins and professional training, and it seems reasonable to suggest 
that they constitute a politicised elite. However, apart from the indisputable 
fact that most directeurs are male, any attempt to construct a typical profile of 
a French departmental secretary is a risky business. That said, despite their 
different positions in the system both directeurs d’administration centrale and 
directeurs de cabinet share a professional experience. They carry out different 
tasks, but are both faced with common pressures. They both have an 
overview of the policy process, but only a limited one. They are both caught 
between pressures from above and below; and they are both at the interface 
of the political and administrative aspects of government. Each of these 
points will be considered in turn and each will discussed in relation, first, to 
directeurs de cabinet and, second, to directeurs d’administration centrale. 
 
i) Departmental secretaries have an overview of the policy process, but 
only a limited one 
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For at least one writer, the directeur de cabinet is the “pivot of the ministry” 
(Thuillier 1982: 40). In this capacity, the directeur is seemingly well placed to 
coordinate the policy-making process. Firstly, all other things being equal 
within the cabinet the directeur is an authoritative figure. Chosen personally by 
the minister the directeur is the undisputed head of the minister’s advisory 
team. From this position the directeur is obliged to maintain a general picture 
of the minister’s work and will have to respond to the particular proposals 
that emanate from within the more policy-oriented elements of the cabinet. In 
so doing, the directeur will have to balance the tension between the political 
and the technical aspects of the cabinet’s work and will filter the information 
that the minister receives from the cabinet system as a whole. Secondly, the 
directeur de cabinet also has an important role to play in managing the work of 
the administration more generally. Either alone or in conjunction with the 
minister, the directeur will often have to arbitrate between the conflicting 
demands of the various directeurs d’administration centrale within the 
department. Again, this means that the directeur de cabinet will have to balance 
both political and internal departmental concerns. However, it also means 
that the directeur de cabinet is uniquely placed within the ministry in that he or 
she has an overview of both the department’s work and the minister’s career. 
 That said, many directeurs de cabinet only have a limited overview of 
the departmental decision-making process. This is for two reasons. Firstly, it 
is relatively common for ministers to appoint special advisers outside the 
normal hierarchy of the cabinet system (such as a chargé de mission auprès du 
ministre). These people may report directly to the minister concerning a 
particular aspect of the department’s work. So, there is the opportunity for 
conflict between the special adviser and the directeur de cabinet. The former 
does not necessarily control the latter. Moreover, it is equally common for 
ministers to appoint unofficial advisers. These people may be concerned with 
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a specific policy issue. Just as often, though, they will assume the role of 
general political advisers. In this way, the pivotal position of the directeur de 
cabinet may again be challenged. Indeed, this may be the minister’s aim. Some 
ministers are more comfortable receiving a variety of recommendations from 
which they can then choose. Secondly, for the department generally, the 
directeur de cabinet may have to deal with junior ministers and their directeurs 
de cabinet. Although a senior minister will have greater authority than any 
junior minister and although ministers may share personal advisers to 
facilitate coordination problems, there is still the risk that the management 
aspect of the directeur de cabinet’s work will be more difficult. Here, specific 
aspects of the department’s work may be overseen by the junior minister’s 
cabinet, the directeur of which may report directly to the senior minister as 
well. All told, therefore, a directeur de cabinet is uniquely placed, but the 
position is not necessarily an uncontested one. 
 A similar point applies to the directeurs d’administration centrale. They 
too have a great deal of authority in their own organisation. Like the 
directeurs de cabinet, they have the legitimacy of having been appointed to the 
post by the minister. Moreover, the appointee will also usually belong to a 
higher civil service grade, or corps, than most of the other people in the 
direction. Thus, politically and professionally the directeur will be well placed 
to oversee the direction. In addition, the structure of the direction strengthens 
the coordination function of the directeur personally. A direction will be split 
into a number of sous-directions (each headed by a sous-directeur), which in 
turn are then split into bureaux (each headed by a chef de bureau). Thus, not 
only are French departments fragmented internally, but directions are too. 
Thus, the directeur is strategically placed to exercise control over the various 
elements of his or her direction. The directeur will have to arbitrate between 
the demands of the various sous-directions and will be expected to exercise 
leadership functions for the direction as a whole. 
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 Again, as with directeurs de cabinet, directeurs d’administration centrale 
only have a limited overview of the policy-making process for two reasons. 
Firstly, each directeur only has responsibility for a particular policy remit. 
There are, of course, great variations between directions in this respect. Some, 
such as the direction du Budget and the direction du Trésor within the Finance 
Ministry, are long-standing and prestigious institutions whose policy affect is 
wide-ranging. However, others, such as perhaps the direction de l’eau in the 
Ministry for Development and the Environment, may or may not be as long-
standing, but their policy affect will certainly be less great. Whatever its 
range, therefore, a direction will only be one of the basic organisational units 
within the department and in terms of overall policy planning the directeur’s 
overview will necessarily be restricted. Indeed, in the case of some of the 
smaller directions mentioned above, it may be highly restricted. Secondly, 
even though most directions are organised vertically (see above) and although 
their policy remit will be set out in an official decree, there is bound to be the 
potential for overlap between different directions. Indeed, Suleiman (1974: 
213) goes so far as to say that “[t]here is scarcely a question that can be settled 
within a single direction or in a single ministry …”. The result, though, is that 
any given directeur is likely to find that a closely related issue is being 
addressed by another direction.26 This overlap generates an in-built, 
institutional propensity for ‘turf wars’ within the French system. At the same 
time, it also makes the coordination process more difficult as a directeur may 
feel that he or she is not in a position to manage every aspect of a particular 
policy matter. 
 
ii)  Departmental secretaries are caught between pressures from above 
and below 
 
 26 
Directeurs de cabinet may occupy a pivotal position in the ministry but this 
position is undoubtedly a strategically difficult one. Their main point of 
reference is the minister. The minister will have certain expectations about 
what the directeur should be doing and these expectations are likely to be 
highly inflated. At the same time, the directeur must be equally sensitive to 
both the other members of the minister’s cabinet and the representatives of the 
central administrative services in the department more generally. They too 
will have highly inflated expectations about what the directeur can achieve for 
them. The result is that any directeur will be a highly “contested’ (Thuillier 
1982: 41) figure. 
 Most ministers do not wish to intervene in the day-to-day working of 
either the cabinet or the central administration generally. Instead, they expect 
the directeur de cabinet to perform these basic managerial functions. At the 
same time ministers also expect directeurs to concentrate on the key aspects of 
policy making. They count on the directeur to be able to present them with 
clear policy choices in which the advantages and disadvantages of rival 
options are outlined. Moreover, ministers expect their directeur to be 
concerned with the political consequences of such options. When the 
subsequent recommendation is discussed with the prime minister’s and/or 
president’s advisers, these consequences will play a fundamental role in the 
final decision on whether the policy should be adopted. And yet, many of the 
subordinate members of the minister’s cabinet as well as most of the 
representatives of the central administration will promote sometimes highly 
technical policy concerns. These people expect political considerations to play 
a role in the final decisions. They do hope, however, that there will still be 
room for specific reforms to be adopted. Needless to say, there is often a 
tension between these considerations. The minister, in conjunction with the 
prime minister and/or president, has the ultimate authority, but it is a 
courageous, or perhaps foolhardy, minister who would always place political 
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considerations above technical ones and in so doing would risk alienating the 
central administration in the department. The directeur de cabinet is the person 
who is at the interface between these conflicting demands. 
 All told, therefore, a directeur de cabinet must be both managerially 
adept and politically aware. The directeur must be sensitive to the cabinet and 
to the central administration. However, he or she must also know the 
minister’s mind and just as importantly the minister’s temperament. The 
result, though, is that: “[c]ontrary to popular belief a directeur de cabinet 
cannot do everything: nothing is simple and his room for manoeuvre is 
strictly limited, however astute he might be” (Thuillier 1979: 12). 
 In some respects, the directeurs d’administration centrale are in a similar 
position. They are caught between the demands and expectations of the 
minister and the cabinet, on the one hand, and the members of the direction, on 
the other. More particularly, ministers have a tendency to see directeurs as the 
spokespersons for the administration, whereas members of the direction often 
see the directeur as a political figure who is simply carrying out the minister’s 
sometimes patently irrational orders. Moreover, there is a further tension in 
that directeurs often see cabinet members as attempting to usurp their position, 
while cabinet members may accuse directeurs of making their job difficult. As 
one writer puts it, directeurs  are “caught between the complaints of the 
subordinate and suspicion of the cabinet” (Thuillier 1979: 41). 
 There is no doubt a minister needs directeurs to promote policies and to 
suggest reforms. And yet the minister is also bound to be suspicious of such 
reforms. The annual budgetary process is a case in point. Here, ministers will 
want to maximise their budget and they will need their services to come up 
with expenditure proposals. All the same, inevitably the proposals will 
exceed the department’s budgetary limit and so the minister will have to 
arbitrate between the conflicting demands. In this case, the role of the 
directeur will be to promote the initiatives from his or her own direction. In so 
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doing, however, the directeur quickly appears as the spokesperson for certain 
entrenched interests, perhaps making it easier for the minister to fall back on 
political motivations when he or she is called upon to make an arbitration. By 
the same token, however, directeurs who are either unwilling or unable to face 
down the minister and who lose out in the arbitration process will just as 
inevitably be viewed with suspicion by the services within the direction. The 
unsuccessful directeur may be viewed as someone who does not have the 
interests of the direction at heart or who is simply not up to the task. Thus, the 
directeur is delicately placed. He or she must stand up to the minister without 
alienating him or her. At the same time the directeur must also faithfully 
represent the direction so as to maintain a degree of loyalty and collegiality. 
 A further tension emerges between the directeur and the cabinet. There 
is long-standing evidence to suggest that directeurs resent what they see as the 
interventionism of the minister’s cabinet. So, Suleiman (1974: 205) reports that 
79.0 per cent of directeurs believed that cabinet members tried to ‘short-circuit’ 
the administration, meaning that they would by-pass the directeur and deal 
directly with other members of the central administration. Similarly, 60.5 per 
cent of directeurs (ibid: 206) thought that the cabinet acted as a screen between 
them and the minister, implying that they were blocking off access to the 
minister. Equally, though, there is likely to be resentment on the part of the 
cabinet towards the directeur. As before, the politically oriented aspect of the 
cabinet may simply see the directeur as a spokesperson for the direction’s 
special interests. Alternatively, the disagreement may be more technical. The 
specialist element of the cabinet may object to the specifics of the reform 
proposal generated by the direction’s services which the directeur is defending. 
In these cases, too, the minister may be called upon to arbitrate, meaning that 
old tensions may surface once again. 
 In these ways, then, the directeurs d’administration centrale are just as 
precariously placed as directeurs de cabinet. They are often appointed with the 
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backing of the minister and they are undoubtedly the most senior element of 
the central administration. However, this position simply means that they 
often end up being seen as too politicised by the administrators and too 
bureaucratised by the politicians. 
 
iii) Departmental secretaries are at the interface of the political and 
administrative aspects of government 
 
The final point underpins the previous two. The essential dilemma of French 
departmental secretaries is that they occupy the position where the political 
and administrative aspects of government overlap. Certainly, this dilemma 
affects directeurs de cabinet and directeurs d’administration centrale in slightly 
different ways, but it is still sufficient to provide them with a shared 
professional experience. 
 Directeurs de cabinet occupy an unequivocally politicised element of the 
politico-administrative structure, but at the same time they cannot simply be 
divorced from the administration. For example, one writer portrays the 
position of the directeur de cabinet in the following terms: “he is in a certain 
way the source of administrative legitimacy, being the highest placed person 
in the hierarchy below the minister, who plays a strictly political role: he is an 
essential component of administrative power” (Thuillier 1982: 50).27 Thus, 
whatever the tensions and suspicions that exist between them, there is a 
certain sense in which the members of the central administration, including 
the directeurs d’administration, consider directeurs de cabinet to be one of their 
own. Indeed, this structural link is reinforced by the sociological ties that bind 
a fair proportion of these people together (see above). After all, directeurs de 
cabinet are often drawn from the grands corps, frequently they have had 
personal experience of the administration and more often than not they have 
undertaken their professional training in the same schools as many of their 
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more senior counterparts within the administration. For the administration, 
therefore, invariably they are ‘one of us’. And yet, for the same people 
directeurs de cabinet are also ‘one of them’. As the minister’s closest 
representative, directeurs de cabinet will sometimes have to be willing to forego 
rationality for the sake of expediency. In this way, they will have to go 
against one of the most fundamental principles that underpins the French 
administrative culture. Moreover, the fact that directeurs de cabinet will often 
have to put politics first not only pits directeurs de cabinet against 
administrators, it also pits directeurs against themselves. For those who were 
brought up as administrators, they will have to be prepared to go against the 
basic principles of their own training. This can make policy advice a difficult 
job to carry out at a personal as well as at a professional level. 
 In contrast to directeurs de cabinet, directeurs d’administration centrale 
occupy an ostensibly administrative element of the politico-administrative 
structure, but they too end up being immersed in the political aspects of the 
policy-making process. So, there is no doubt that most directeurs 
d’administration centrale exude professional competence; many of them are 
drawn from the grands corps, the most prestigious institutions with the 
administration. Moreover, as administrative initiatives come up through the 
chain of command in the direction, there is also no doubt that directeurs serve 
as the primary spokespersons for these initiatives when they are discussed 
with the minister and the minister’s cabinet. At the same time, directeurs are 
also obliged to implement policy decisions made by the minister down 
through the self-same chain of command. Thus, inevitably they will have to 
use their authority to impose unpopular decisions on subordinate services. 
Moreover, as they are sometimes political, or at least politicised, appointees, 
when they do so their motives are likely to be viewed with suspicion by those 
in the direction whom the decisions affect. All told, as with directeurs de cabinet, 
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directeurs d’administration centrale sometimes find their job a difficult one to 
carry out both in relation to others and to themselves. 
 
Personal accounts 
 
The aim of this section is to provide two personal reflections on the more 
general aspects of the role of French departmental secretaries. These accounts 
are not representative nor are they meant to be. It is not claimed that they 
constitute a cross-section of all departmental secretaries in France since 1970. 
M. Gaeremynck and M. Belaval are not necessarily typical of the whole set of 
directeurs d’administration centrale. Instead, they have been chosen because 
what they have to say is suggestive. It is indicative of the various ways in 
which departmental secretaries understand their role and how they 
experience it from a personal point of view. 
 As will become clear, M. Gaeremynck and M. Belaval have many 
things in common. They are almost the same age; they have had a similar 
professional training; and clearly they occupy equivalent positions within the 
administrative structure. Indeed, more than that, they are not just colleagues 
but also friends. That said, as will also become clear, while they share a 
similar perspective about many of the different aspects of the French 
administrative system, there are also a number of differences between them: 
differences of perspective, differences of appreciation and differences of 
judgement. The fact that directeurs share many things in common, but that 
there are also a great many differences between even the most seemingly 
similar of them is the main argument of this paper. 
 
i) Jean Gaeremynck, Directeur de la Population et des Migrations, Ministry 
of Employment 
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Jean Gaeremynck was born on 7 March 1954. After initially thinking of going 
to the École Normale Supérieure and training to be a teacher, he quickly 
decided to go to the Institut des Sciences Politiques in Paris (Sciences Po) and 
then passed the entrance exam to ENA. He graduated from ENA in 1980 
(promotion Voltaire), was classed well and chose to enter the Conseil d’État. 
After five years in the Conseil d’État he then took the rather unusual step, in 
the present-day context at least, of going to Africa, serving as an adviser to 
the President of Senegal for four years. He returned to the Conseil d’État in 
1989 and a year later was appointed to the cabinet of the Minister for Justice, 
Pierre Méhaignerie, who was a member of the right-wing coalition. When the 
Minister left office in 1995, M. Gaeremynck returned to the Conseil d’État. He 
was subsequently appointed to the post of directeur d’administration centrale on 
27 March 1997, again under a right-wing government, but maintained this 
post when the left took power just a couple of months later. At the time of the 
interview he had been in office for exactly three years. 
 M. Gaeremynck first thought about becoming a civil servant very early 
on: “During the course of my secondary education, I think. Around the age of 
13-14. Something like that”. His background was clearly state-centred and he 
told the following story: “Listen, when I entered the sixth class, … I was 10 
years old, the first day at school the teacher put a portrait of General de 
Gaulle above his desk. [Laughter] No, it’s just to give you an idea of my 
background. I’m 46 years old. I was born in 1954. The background in which I 
grew up when I was little — and even in the whole of the environment in 
which I was brought up, school, family, etc. — it wasn’t a cult, it’s not the 
way my family is, but let’s say that there was an extremely positive 
appreciation of the General’s role in restoring France, the State etc.. I grew up 
in this sort of environment. So, for me, I think that [the role of the 
administration] was placed very highly because of all this”. 
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 Against this background, M. Gaeremynck followed a classic career 
path, going first to Sciences Po and then to ENA. Asked about his time at both 
places he recounted: “They are two quite different institutions. Sciences Po is 
really an intellectual awakening because you take a wide variety of subjects 
and in addition the education is very good both in terms of university 
teaching and also in terms of action because many of the lecturers are 
practitioners … practitioners from the administration. For example, currently 
I take a seminar at Sciences Po. I’m teaching there. But on the other hand you 
also have some very very good specialists, lecturers, researchers. It’s this 
mixture of the two that makes Sciences Po such an interesting place. So, I 
have a very fond memory of Sciences Po, even if preparing for the [ENA] 
exam was more utilitarian and less interesting … less exciting, but basically 
the teaching was very rich. It’s a place where you meet people, a place where 
you mix. A sort of ‘melting-pot’ [said in English]. There you have it. ENA was 
completely different … You’ve already become part of the public service. At 
ENA you are already a civil servant. You’ve already been recruited. The aim 
of the School is obviously to teach you something, but you work towards the 
final grade so that you can then have a choice [of where to go]. I don’t have a 
bad memory of ENA … because what I liked was really the applied teaching. 
At ENA that’s really it. I mean, the work-placement period, the applied 
seminars. You analyse a problem not for the sake of scientific advancement, 
but so as to end up with propositions and I liked that. … It depends also a 
little bit on the environment, the people you work with, the people giving the 
seminars that you can go to. In this respect, for me, it was good. And I didn’t 
really mind the competitive side of things which is really there at ENA. But 
that also really depends on the year, the ambience, the friends that you make. 
It’s really very variable  …”. 
 Although in a number respects M. Gaeremynck’s subsequent career 
path was highly typical, his appointment as a directeur d’administration centrale 
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was slightly unusual in that he was groomed for the job prior to his official 
appointment. Describing his career, he said: “I went back to the Conseil d’Etat 
[in 1995]. And then I was asked — having made it known that I had an 
interest in social affairs, in [refugee and immigrant] integration issues on 
which I had already worked — I was put in line for the job here. I was asked 
to write a report”. He was then immediately questioned as to whether his 
appointment had come as a surprise, to which he replied: “A great surprise, 
no. Because as I just said a few months beforehand I was sort of put in line for 
the job, asked to write a report … Given my background, I was the age when 
normally you take up this sort of position, but well becoming a directeur is 
never automatic. It’s never anyone’s right. It’s a point in a career when you 
take up a “very important” post in inverted commas shall we say, or at least 
relatively speaking, in terms of the French administrative structures, it’s a 
very important post. So, obviously I was very happy. I can’t say that it came 
out the blue, like that, because I was prepared for it, if you like. But, I was 
very pleased”. When pressed on this point, he went on to say: “[The cabinet] 
asked me if I wouldn’t mind doing a report for them on the relaunch of 
integration policy, which I did, which I did a few months before [my 
appointment]. So, I made a few contacts, did some reading, wrote the report. 
And following the report there was a series of administrative meetings which 
were designed to determine the programme which would relaunch the 
integration policy, which the Minister wanted to determine and lead, and so I 
was part of that. So, I can tell you that about six months before I was actually 
appointed I was already part of the system, if you like”. 
 Regarding the nature of the policy process, M. Gaeremynck stated: 
“What is a policy? A policy is a discourse, a political direction, a political will 
set out by the Minister and then the action programme behind it … Well, we, 
I, participate all the time with the cabinet in determining the Minister’s 
political direction and when it comes to action plans we are always defining 
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them, enriching them, adjusting them. But I think that really my role is to 
propose things. I think that it is my job all the time to put forward 
propositions to the cabinet so as to meet a certain objective, to react to an 
unexpected event, to adjust an action plan that has been agreed but that 
needs to be adjusted during the implementation process. You see.” 
 In terms of his policy impact, the directeur had a particular notion of his 
role, which he stressed on a number of occasions. For example, at one point 
he stated: “I believe that I have the power to propose. And, the ideal thing, I 
find, is to be given an instruction that you’ve formulated yourself. I think 
that’s ideal. In any case, there’s a constant exchange with the cabinet. We talk. 
When it comes to a proposal, it’s yes for this, yes for that, or no for that … The 
work is a sort of permanent iteration. By contrast, this power to propose … 
when it comes to my colleagues [within the direction] is independent, or 
almost independent, of the hierarchical structure. That’s to say, if there is 
someone who’s not very high up in a bureau, who is not even a chef de bureau, 
for example, he can still have a very good idea … I ask the sous-directeurs, the 
chefs de bureau to make sure that everyone can contribute so that if there’s a 
good idea around somewhere we can grab it and I make sure that it is 
presented to the cabinet. Do you understand?”. 
 In this context, M. Gaeremynck also insisted that he had the power to 
influence policy decisions: “Listen. A directeur is appointed to a position 
which usually gives him an enormous power to influence things. I don’t like 
the term ‘power’ on its own because I don’t think it means very much. By 
contrast, I like the term ‘power to influence’. A directeur is an influential man, 
or an influential person. What is an influential person? Well, first of all, he 
influences policies in the sense that if he’s permanently putting forward 
proposals, then he ends up by adding to the minister’s policy. On the other 
hand he’s at the point in the system where the information system and 
system which gives out instructions, which determines the programme, 
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converge. As such, usually he usually has an enormous influence over his 
administration. Usually. It depends also on the size of the direction. But, you 
know, he is an influential person. He is in a unique position. Unique”. 
 Another aspect of the interview was the emphasis the directeur placed 
on the network of contacts he had established through his membership of the 
Conseil d’État. “When it comes to directeurs, we all know each other, just 
about, in the Conseil d’État. In addition, when you have this type of job, it 
corresponds to a logical type of administrative career path. So, you’re the 
same sort of age, do you see? You know everyone else. It’s the way things are. 
I don’t know the youngest of my colleagues very well, but they’re not 
directeurs. They’re not at the controls, if I can put it like that. By contrast, those 
who are at the controls, whether they are directeurs d’administration centrale, or 
those who are in ministerial cabinets, or the Prime Minister’s cabinet, we know 
each other. I know them all. It’s a great network. I won’t say that it fixes 
things … but, you know, the fact that we know each other, it makes things 
easier. Earlier, we were talking about the Ministry of the Interior, the directeur 
des libertés publiques et des affaires juridiques, well he’s a former colleague from 
the Conseil d’État who joined the Conseil a year before me. We’ve known 
each other for a long time. Well, we’ve both got some delicate and difficult 
issues to deal with. Our colleagues see each other and sometimes things get 
blocked completely. I’ll give Jean-Marie a ring, we’ll see each other, have 
lunch. Well, it’s not automatic. We manage to resolve the problem by talking 
to each other face to face. It’s not automatic. Sometimes it’s so much a 
question of the ministerial line, the traditional ministerial line, that we don’t 
manage to sort things out. But, well, it’s quite unusual for us not to find a 
solution”. Asked why it was usually possible to find a solution he replied: 
“It’s a function of belonging to the same corps. The esprit de corps is so strong 
in the French system … There aren’t very many of us in the Conseil d’État. 
About 300 all told. So, the esprit de corps is very strong. Another thing which is 
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unique to the Conseil d’État is that when you are inside it the jobs are 
distributed in such a way that you are not in competition with anyone else or 
scarcely so. So, the mood inside the Conseil d’État is really good … The 
rivalry is at ENA”. 
 Finally, M. Gaeremynck was asked whether the administration had 
changed in recent times. “Well, in terms of its organisation, not really … The 
way in which the system is organised into directions and even the internal 
structure of directions, the relations with the cabinet etc., I think that it hasn’t 
really, really changed. By contrast, what’s in the process of changing a lot is 
the way of working, the administrative way of working. Because, it’s true, we 
are modernising the method. We are using the new technologies, internet, 
intranet etc., paging … We’re also trying to develop a more horizontal way of 
working. That’s to say, for example, linking an action plan with a project. 
Leading the project is a project manager who has a predetermined mission, a 
team. Things like that. It allows a vertical logic, which is traditionally the 
logic of the administration, to coexist with a horizontal logic …”. 
 
2. Philippe Belaval, Directeur des Archives de France, Ministry of Culture 
and Communication 
 
Philippe Belaval was born on 21 August 1955 in Toulouse. He obtained a 
Masters in law and studied at the Institut d’Études Politiques in Toulouse. He 
took the entrance exam to ENA and passed it. At the end of his time there he 
was classed very well and chose to enter the Conseil d’État. After four years 
in the Conseil d’État he entered the cabinet of the Socialist Budget Minister, 
Henri Emmanuelli, in 1983. After briefly returning to the Conseil d’État when 
the right won power in 1986, he was then appointed as the directeur adjoint in 
the cabinet of the Public Service Minister, Michel Durafour, when the left 
returned to power in 1988 and was subsequently appointed as Durafour’s 
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directeur de cabinet in 1990. Later that year he took up the post of the manager 
of the Opéra de Paris. After another brief spell in the Conseil d’État from 
1992-94, he was then appointed as the head of Bibliothèque nationale where he 
was in post for four years. Finally, he was appointed as the directeur des 
archives de France in the Ministry of Culture and Communication in July 1998 
by the Socialist Minister, Catherine Trautmann. 
 M. Belaval first thought about joining the higher civil service much 
later than M. Gaeremynck. “I was studying law and political science and, 
well, I didn’t have a very clear idea of what I wanted to do. My parents saw 
me perhaps as a lawyer, or something like that. Then, there was the exam, the 
entrance exam to ENA. I wasn’t really sure whether I was good enough. And 
then, as a result of circumstances, friends, teachers, I took the exam and 
passed it. So, I ended up as a higher civil servant more by chance than by 
vocation or choice”. When asked about his impression of the French 
administration before he entered ENA, he replied in a similar way: “I had no 
concrete idea of what the administration was. I took the ENA exam with a 
really vague idea of what it did, what sort of careers you were being trained 
to do … I’m a bad choice [of someone to interview] in this respect because, if 
you like, firstly, I don’t come from a civil service family, so it would be wrong 
to say that I did it out of atavism or a desire to follow in the family footsteps. 
I’d even say that, well, my father was a businessman and he had an anti-
bureaucratic culture, at least he didn’t particularly like civil servants. So, it’s 
certainly not because my family influenced me that I did it. And also it’s not, 
how should I say, out of a sense of vocation, of being part of the public 
service. It’s really just circumstances that account for it. And it’s only 
afterwards that I realised that it suited me very well, that it corresponded to 
my tastes and to things I believed in”. 
 In terms of his professional training, M. Belaval also had a slightly 
different impression of ENA than M. Gaeremynck, although their attitude to 
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their respective Instituts d’Études Politiques is similar. He stated: “With 
regard to Sciences Po I remember that it was a difficult time. It was hard 
work, because you had to work, work, work so that you could pass the exam. 
The years passed relatively quickly, but relatively austerely. I’d just qualify 
that by saying that the last few months, the time when I was preparing for the 
exam, were quite stimulating intellectually speaking. Because in preparing for 
the exam as it was then you were forced to study a lot of subjects, to be up to 
date with current affairs, which resulted in a feeling of intellectual fulfilment 
that I haven’t experienced since. And definitely not at ENA, where, apart 
from the work-placement period, I remember the teaching as being very 
unrewarding, very unpleasant in a environment that wasn’t really very nice 
with very few acquaintances, very few friendships. And, in addition the 
content of the teaching wasn’t very interesting at all, apart from the modern 
languages side of things, the sport, things like that. So, overall the memory of 
my time at ENA is a much more gloomy, much more negative one than the 
memory of my time at Sciences Po …”. When pressed as to why he had a very 
different reaction to the two institutions, he replied: “There’s no real value-
added [at ENA after Sciences Po]. A big difference is that there aren’t really 
any lectures at ENA, but there are things which are supposed to be preparing 
you for administrative life. But quickly it becomes a bit artificial because the 
only real preparation is actually doing it. Pretending to be a higher civil 
servant is a bit, well, a bit ridiculous. So, in intellectual terms it was pretty 
weak and the mood in my year, well it depends from one year to the next, but 
mine, well, it wasn’t the worst, but still it wasn’t very nice. And then it’s true 
the final grading makes you very anxious because you hear that so many 
things depend on it. So, all that means that even 20 years later I have quite a 
negative feeling about it”. 
 In further contrast to M. Gaeremynck, M. Belaval’s subsequent 
appointment as a directeur came out of the blue. He recounted the following 
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story: “I had no idea at all that I was going to be offered the post of directeur 
… I think that I was appointed because traditionally the directeur of the 
Archives was either a chartist or an historian. It had never been an énarque. 
But, my predecessor was up against a certain number of problems as a result 
of which he resigned in a fairly spectacular way in June 1998. Well, his 
resignation shed a bit of light on the difficulties of the institution. The 
government decided that to put these difficulties right, which were 
difficulties related to relations with the other administrative services etc., it 
needed someone who knew the administration a bit better, who knew the 
state machine a bit better than historians and chartists. So, naturally they 
thought of someone in the Conseil d’État and, as it was known that I wanted 
to leave the Bibliothèque nationale, I was asked. It was a complete surprise. I 
wasn’t expecting it at all”. Again, when pressed on this matter, he elaborated 
further. He said: “It began with a phone call. It was a Friday. I was told, well, 
there you are, we’re thinking of you. What do you think about it? I said that I 
would think about it and call back on Monday. On Monday, I said that we 
should meet because, yes, I might be interested. And by Wednesday it was all 
agreed. But, you know, a direction is a direction. It’s duties are set out. It’s not 
at all like in the private sector where you might be able to negotiate. I wasn’t 
going to say I’ll take that, but not that. So, it’s all or nothing. I did indeed 
have conversations about what the policy was going to be, what the strategy 
was etc., but that’s all”. 
 Whatever the differences between M. Gaeremynck and M. Belaval, the 
impression gained from the interviews was that they had a relatively similar 
idea of their role and the extent to which they were able to influence the 
decision-making process. “What you have is an organisation that’s very old, 
long-lasting. There are a lot of people who were here before me and who will 
be here after me. So, it’s difficult to leave a mark. But, well, you work at it … 
I’m convinced that the time when you could command the administration in 
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the way that Frederick the Great commanded the army has gone. 
Consequently, you have to try to get the best result through dialogue, 
participation and by creating a team, a community. What I’m trying to do is 
to create an atmosphere around me where people feel good and are 
motivated by the same aims and objectives that I have myself. I believe that 
when people are happy with what they’re doing, then they’re excellent”. 
Furthermore, when asked whether he was a manager or a leader, he replied: 
“Both. It’s often a coordinating role in the sense that it’s sometimes difficult, 
although it might appear surprising in such a small direction, to get people to 
work together. So, I have to make sure that people have been consulted, that 
they have had their say etc. It’s also a leadership role because very often I’ll 
say, what if we did this or that etc.”. All told, it is highly likely that any one of 
his colleagues would have endorsed this view of the role of a directeur. 
 Equally, when asked about the power of technocrats in the system and 
the importance of the contacts that he had established, M. Belaval’s 
appreciation was very similar to the one provided by M. Gaeremynck and yet 
his tone was still noticeably different in some respects. When asked about 
whether he benefited from the contacts that he had made, he replied: “Yes, of 
course, it helps. It helps. But I mean, if [a colleague] wasn’t a member of the 
Conseil d’État, I’d still ring him to sort out the problem … I was really very 
struck when I was appointed here. My appointment didn’t go unnoticed 
because I was the first non-chartist since 1850-something and the first non-
historian ever appointed. So, people said, there you are, another conquest for 
the Conseil d’État, another conquest for the énarchie … But nobody ever said 
to me, here you are, here’s the énarchie flag or the Conseil d’État flag go and 
raise it there. It so happens that I’m here, it’s true, but, I mean, when I leave 
I’m not sure that it will help the person who comes after me … At the risk of 
appearing naive, perhaps I’m really out of the loop, perhaps I’m wrong, but 
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there’s no sort of organised lobby, or secret law which is imparted to people 
…”. 
 Finally, in contrast to M. Gaeremynck, M. Belaval suggested that there 
was only a limited degree of horizontal coordination in his department. 
“Traditionally the Culture Ministry is organised very vertically in the way it 
sees things. So, in our area, there’s not a lot of synergy, there’s not a lot of 
coming together. And, moreover, in reality this situation is worsened by the 
fact that we’re located some way away from the others  … in an area which 
traditionally is not an administrative one. So, this doesn’t help contacts and 
dialogue. I think that the Ministry is not horizontal enough. I don’t have 
frequent enough contacts with my colleagues about policy matters.” 
 
Conclusion 
 
There are certain well established academic traditions in the study of the 
French administration.28 There is, for example, a long-standing argument that 
the French higher civil sevice form part of a socially unrepresentative power-
block (Birnbaum et al 1978). According to one version of this argument, the 
policy preferences of senior public servants simply reflect the highly 
privileged nature of their particular social background. By contrast, another 
well-known account emphasises the fact that many senior civil servants have 
undergone a specific form of educational and professional training and 
suggests that France is a technocracy (Meynaud 1968), meaning that policy 
making is dominated by a group of people who try to resolve social 
dilemmas by reference to technical solutions. A final argument is based on 
the observation that the administration has become increasingly politicised 
and that incoming governments have used their powers to place politically 
supportive people in the main posts in the administration (Dagnaud and 
Mehl 1982). 
 43 
 The logic of this chapter is that the above arguments, and those like 
them, are misleading. At any one point in time in France there are a great 
many departmental secretaries who are living a wide variety of personal 
experiences. Moreover, the variety of experiences is only likely to increase in 
the years to come as the pressures to modernise and diversify the central 
administration increase. This is not to say that there is nothing that links these 
people together now. Nor is it to say that there will not continue to be links 
between them in the future. On the contrary, substantial percentages of 
departmental secretaries are drawn from relatively similar social 
backgrounds, have undergone the same sort of professional training and have 
been appointed to more or less politicised positions. These are indeed the 
basic generalisations that can be made about French departmental secretaries. 
However, to acknowledge these links does not mean that it is possible simply 
to read off the preferences of this set of higher civil servants by reference 
solely to their social, professional or party political backgrounds. Even those 
departmental secretaries who are drawn from the same background, who 
have been through the same training procedure and who have been 
appointed to relatively similar posts are still likely to make sense of their 
previous experiences in a variety of different ways and to have a different 
judgement about their current and future role. In short, while it is possible to 
generalise about the French higher civil service, it is important not to over-
generalise; while it is necessary to identify the aspects which are common to 
this set of highly influential decision-makers, it is also necessary to appreciate 
the specific ways in which individuals construct their own personal reality 
that they then apply to the world around them. 
 44 
Notes
                                                 
1 There were 25 governments in its 12 year history. 
2 Article 21 also states that the prime minister is responsible for national defence. This clause, 
though, is respected more in the breach than in the observance. 
3 For an overview of the different academic interpretations of the French state, see Elgie and 
Griggs (2000: chap. 1). 
4 It should be noted that the ‘plural’ left government, which includes representatives from the 
Communist party, has also approved a number of privatisation proposals since coming to 
power in 1997. 
5 There is, however, some variation between Ministries. For example, the Ministry of 
Equipment has experimented with departmental directorates which have given directeurs 
d’administration centrale a greater degree of flexibility with regard, for example, to pay levels. 
(Information from personal interviews, see also Trosa 1995: 59-61). 
6 The example of the direction des routes (roads divisions) in the Ministry of Transport is a case 
in point. (Information from perosnal interviews). 
7 In her Siwek-Pouydesseau (1969) also compared these two institutions. 
8 In fact, similar structures can also be headed by people who hold such titles as délégué, 
délégué général, haut-commissaire and commissaire as well (de Baecque and Quermonne 1983: p. 
151). 
9 The Employment Ministry maintained the old system until 1960; there was a secrétariat 
général in the Post and Telecommunications Ministry until 1970; and in 1963 the Education 
Ministry reverted back to the old secrétariat général structure only for the experiment to be 
abandoned six years later (de Baecque 1973: 202). 
10 Indeed, it it might be noted that for one writer at least directeurs de cabinet are considered to 
be the true equivalent of the British permanent secretary (Quermonne 1991: 64). 
11 It must be assumed that the figure on p. 135 of this work is a misprint. 
12 This figure includes those who may have served as a directeur de cabinet on more than one 
occasion during this period. 
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13 In addition to the statistical evidence, the following sections are also partly based on 
interviews with a number of directeurs d’administration centrale. These interviews took place in 
March 2000. The author would like to thank the directeurs concerned for sparing some of their 
very valuable time. 
14 See, for example, Birnbaum (1982) and Meynaud (1968). 
15 The author would like to thank Prof. Rouban for the use of this material. The figures cited 
in the rest of this section are all taken directly from Siwek-Pouydesseau (1969) and Rouban 
(1996). 
16 It might be noted that from 1984-96 9 per cent of directeurs de cabinet were women. In fact, 
this marks an increase over earlier periods, where, for example, from 1958-72 there were no 
female directeurs de cabinet at all (Rouban 1997a: 23). 
17 This is perhaps the implication in Thuillier (1982: 40). 
18 See Le Monde, 4 November, 1999. 
19 See Rouban (1999: 69). 
20 One writer notes that after 1997, President Chirac had no alternative but to accept the 
appointment of new directeurs in the Education, Finance and Interior Ministries (Yolka 1999: 
747-48). 
21 Decree no. 59-442, 21 March 1959. 
22 The only conditions are the ones that apply to all civil servants, namely that they must be 
French, that they must possess all their civic rights, that there must be no irregularity with 
regard to their national service and that they must physically capable of carrying out the 
functions associated with their job. 
23 The term ‘corps’ refers to a group of officials who enjoy the same conditions of service and 
who carry out the same tasks within the administration. Consequently, every civil servant is a 
member of a corps and there are over 1,300 different corps within the French administration. 
However, as noted in the text, there is no corps of directeurs d’administration centrale. This is 
why appointees are deemed to be on secondment from their original corps or grade. 
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24 In Rouban’s (1996) study, 32 of the 555 people who were appointed as a directeur from 1984-
94 left office and were then reappointed at some stage during this same period. 
25 Although somewhat outdated, still one of the best studies of the relationship between 
ministers, cabinets and directeurs can be found in Suleiman (1974: esp. 137-238). 
26 In the French system, power to reorganise the ministry lies with the minister personally. 
Thus, incoming ministers often take the opportunity to shift responsibilities from one direction 
to another, to amalgamate directions or even to abolish them altogether. 
27 Emphasis in the original. 
28 For an overview, see Elgie and Griggs (2000: chap. 3). 
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Table 1 
The civil service background of directeurs de cabinet 1984-94 (per cent) 
 
Administrateurs civils 24.8 
Administrative grands corps 44.2 
Technical grands corps   8.0 
Teachers   4.1 
Contract workers   2.4 
 
Have been to ENA 64.8 
Have been to the X   4.6 
 
Source: Rouban (1997a: 23) 
 
Table 2 
Immediate career trajectory of directeurs d’administration centrale and 
directeurs adjoints 1984-94 (per cent) 
 
Administrative position 13.3 
Managerial posts (directeurs)   9.0 
Abroad   4.5 
Grands corps 11.0 
Public sector organisation 
(établissement public) 
  7.7 
Public sector company 
(entreprise public) 
  4.5 
Local government   2.1 
Politics   1.7 
Private sector   6.4 
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Cabinet 36.8 
Other   0.6 
Not known   2.6 
 
Source: Rouban (1997a: 27) 
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Table 3 
Institutional origins of directeurs d’administration centrale 1984-94 (per 
cent) 
 
In post in the same ministry 
Member of a cabinet 
Public sector company 
Private company 
Non-ministerial corps 
Inspection service 
Directeur of another ministry 
Member of a grands corps 
Directeur in the same ministry 
Paris city council or Île-de-France 
Abroad 
19.2 
22.6 
11.1 
  4.9 
10.4 
  2.1 
  7.8 
  6.7 
  3.7 
  2.3 
  9.2 
 
 
Source: Rouban (1996: 30) 
 
Table 4 
Immediate career trajectory of directeurs d’administration centrale 1984-94 
(per cent) 
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Post in the same ministry 
Post in another ministry 
Public sector company 
Private company 
Returned to original grade in corps 
Inspection service 
Grands corps 
Abroad 
Elected to political office 
Paris city council or Ile-de-France 
Retirement 
12.0 
  3.1 
11.6 
  8.4 
11.2 
  6.9 
10.4 
  7.5 
  0.6 
  0.6 
  2.0 
 
 
Source: Rouban (1996: 31) 
 
